Abstract. In this paper we introduce a semantic-based approach for code obfuscation. The aim of code obfuscation is to prevent malicious users to disclose properties of the original source program. This goal can be precisely modeled by abstract interpretation, where the hiding of properties corresponds to abstract the semantics. We derive a general theory based on abstract interpretation, where the potency of code obfuscation can be measured by comparing hidden properties in the lattice of abstract interpretations. Semantic-based code obfuscation is applied to show that well known program transformation methods, such as constant propagation, can be seen as code obfuscation.
Introduction
Code obfuscation is a program transformation typically intended to prevent reverse engineering [2, [4] [5] [6] . A number of results are known in the literature providing obfuscation algorithms such as: Layout transformations, which remove source code formatting and scramble identifiers; control transformations, which affect the control flow of the program; and data transformations, which operate obfuscating the data structures used in the program [5] . The major negative result on code obfuscation is given in Barak et al. [1] . They prove that there is no obfuscation method that works for any program and it is able to transform them in such a way that the only properties which can be disclosed are those which can be derived from the input/output semantics. This result is not as bad as it might seen, in fact even though the "ideal" obfuscator of Barak et al. does not exist, software obfuscation would be still useful when employed for hiding specific code properties and working for specific classes of programs [14] . The classical notion of code obfuscation of Collberg et al. [4] [5] [6] defines an obfuscator as a potent transformation that preserves the observable behavior of programs. In this setting a transformation is potent when the obfuscated program is more complex than the original one. Clearly this definition of code obfuscator relies on a fixed metric for measuring program complexity, and finding such metrics is a major challenge in practical code obfuscation algorithms.
The problem
The major drawback of most software obfuscation techniques is that they do not have a well found theoretical base, and thus it is unclear how effective they are. Even if semantic preservation is implied in code obfuscation [18] , the lack of a complete formal setting where these program transformations can be studied defects any possibility of comparing them with respect to their ability to obfuscate program properties. The main problem here is to fix a measure for potency. Usually syntactic (textual) measures are considered, such as code length, nesting-levels, fan-in-out complexity, branching, etc [5] . Semantic-based measures are instead less common, even thought they may provide a deeper insight in the true potency of code obfuscation. In order to understand this point we need to model attackers, i.e., code de-obfuscation techniques. Static program analysis is the standard method for making reverse-engineering. Recently dynamic attacks have also been considered in [3] for strengthening static ones for de-obfuscation. Both static and dynamic attacks strongly relies upon program semantics: the first corresponds precisely to a decidable semantic abstraction, while the last are based on the concrete semantics, e.g., interpreters. In both cases syntactic measures can be misleading. More significant measures have to be derived from semantics and this, as far as we know, is an open problem.
Main results
In this paper we consider the lattice of abstract interpretations as the domain for measuring potency. The goal of code obfuscation is to prevent reverse engineering (e.g., by static or dynamic analysis) to grasp sensible properties on program's structure and semantics. It is well known that static analysis can be completely and fully specified as an abstract interpretation [10] , i.e., as an approximation of the concrete semantics of programs. Similarly, dynamic analysis can be seen as a possibly non decidable approximation of the concrete semantics. In this sense, code obfuscation can be seen as a way to prevent that some information about program behaviour is disclosed by an abstract interpretation of its semantics. In order to apply abstract interpretation as a model for attackers, we need to replace syntactic code obfuscators with corresponding semantic transformations. Recently, Cousot & Cousot in [12] have introduced a semantic-based formalization of program transformation based on abstract interpretation. In this construction the relation between syntactic and semantic transformations is specified by an abstract interpretation, where syntax is an abstraction of semantics. This allows us to mirror code obfuscators, viewed as syntactic transformations, in the semantics, by considering corresponding semantic obfuscators instead. Therefore the role of abstract interpretation in a semantic-based approach to code obfuscation is crucial: By fixing a formal relation between syntactic and semantic transformations, abstract interpretation provides the most general setting where attackers can be compared by comparing abstractions, leading us to derive a semantic-based metric for the potency of code obfuscation. Traditionally code obfuscation is intended to preserve input/output (denotational) semantics of programs. This is again an unreasonable restriction: Semantics at different levels of abstraction can be related by abstract interpretation in a hierarchy of semantics [9] . Therefore, any program transformation τ which preserves a given semantics in the hierarchy may act as a code obfuscation for those properties that are not preserved by the transformation. The idea is that the transformed program τ [[P ]] is more complex (obscure) then the original program P , i.e., τ is potent, when there exists a semantic property, i.e., an abstract semantics, which is not preserved by the transformed program
. Potency is therefore strictly related with the rate of abstraction of the most concrete preserved semantics of a code transformation. This corresponds to map code transformations to the lattice of abstract interpretations to measure their obfuscating potency. We introduce a constructive systematic method for deriving the most concrete preserved abstraction of a generic code transformation. Then we generalize Collberg et al. definition of code obfuscation [4, 5] by considering as obfuscators those transformations that mask some abstractions in the lattice of abstract interpretations. This means that, in principle, any program transformation may potentially act as a code obfuscator. We show how a well known program transformation for solving the constant propagation problem, can be seen as a code obfuscator. In this case the transformation acts as a code obfuscator relatively to the command-line structure.
Preliminaries
Abstract Interpretation. The notation C, ≤, ∨, ∧, , ⊥ denotes a complete lattice C, with ordering ≤, lub ∨, glb ∧, greatest element , and least element ⊥. x ∈ C is meet-irreducible if x = a ∧ b then x ∈ {a, b}. The set of meetirriducibile elements in C is denoted M irr(C). The downward closure of S ⊆ C is ↓ S def = {x ∈ C|∃y ∈ S.x ≤ y}, and for x ∈ C, ↓ x is a shorthand for ↓ {x}, while the upward closure ↑ is dually defined. Abstract domains can be formulated either in terms of Galois connections or upper closures operators [11] . An upper closure operator on a ordered set C, µ : C → C, is a monotone, idempotent, and extensive (∀x ∈ C.x ≤ µ(x)) function. With uco(C) we denote the set of all upper closure operators of C. Each closure µ ∈ uco(C) is uniquely determined by the set of its fix-points µ(C) [17] . X ⊆ C is a set of fix-points of an upper closure operator on C iff X is a Moore family of C, i.e., X = M(X) def = {∧S|S ⊆ X} -where ∧∅ = ∈ M(X). If C is a complete lattice also uco(C) is a complete lattice denoted by uco(C), , , , λx. , λx.x where, given two closures η and µ, η µ iff µ(C) ⊆ η(C). On the other side a concrete domain C and an abstract domain A form a Galois Connection (GC), denoted by (C, α, A, γ), when α : C → A and γ : A → C define an adjunction, namely ∀x ∈ C, y ∈ A : α(x) ≤ y ⇔ x ≤ γ(y). Given a GC (C, α, A, γ) the closure corresponding to the abstract domain A is ρ = γ•α on C. If ρ is a closure in C and ι : ρ(C) → A is an isomorphism of complete lattices (with inverse ι −1 ), then (C, ι•ρ, A, ι −1 ) is a GC. Given a function f : C → C and a closure α ∈ uco(C), then f is a correct (sound)
Arithmetic expressions
and l is the undefined label Table 1 . Abstract syntax [10, 16] . The point-wise ordering on uco(C) corresponds to the standard ordering used to compare abstract domains with regard to their precision: Let ρ i ∈ uco(C) and
: i∈I A i is the most concrete among the domains in uco(C) which is abstraction of all the A i 's, i.e., i∈I A i is the least (w.r.t ) common abstraction of all the A i 's, and i∈I A i is the well-known reduced product of all the A i 's, namely the most abstract among the domains in uco(C) which is more concrete then every A i . Complementation corresponds to the inverse of reduced product [7] , namely an operator that, given two domains C D, gives as result the most abstract domain C D, whose reduces product with D is exactly
Semantics. Given a transition system Σ,
, where Σ is a nonempty set of states and ⊆ Σ × Σ is the transition relation over states, we denote by Σ + and Σ ω def = N → Σ respectively the finite nonempty and the infinite sequences of symbols in Σ. Let σ ∈ Σ ∞ def = Σ + ∪ Σ ω be a generic (finite or infinite) sequence of states then |σ| ∈ N ∪ ω is its length, σ i is its i-th element, and σ f is the final state if σ ∈ Σ + . A finite (infinite) sequence of states σ is a program trace when for all i < |σ| : σ i , σ i+1 ∈ , denoted σ = σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ i . . . . In the following σ i σ denotes the concatenation of a state σ i with a trace σ. In this context µ is a subtrace of σ if there exists i, j ∈ [0, |σ|), where i < j, and µ = σ i . . . σ j . The maximal trace semantics of a transition system is τ
is the set of finite traces and τ ω the set of infinite traces [9] of τ . From now on the trace semantics τ ∞ of the program P is considered as the concrete se-
Cousot defines a hierarchy of semantics, where the big-step, termination and nontermination, Plotkin's natural, Smyth's demonic, Hoare's angelic relational and corresponding denotational, Dijkstra's predicate transformer weakest-precondition and weakest-liberal precondition and Hoare's partial and total axiomatic semantics, have all been derived by successive abstractions from the maximal trace semantics of a transition system τ ∞ . In this setting uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) is the lattice of abstract semantics, namely each closure in uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) represents an abstraction of trace semantics. For example the (natural) denotational semantics D ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) can be formalized as an ab- 
D abstracts away the history of the computation by observing the input/output relation of finite traces and the input of diverging computations only. In the following we consider the simple imperative language defined in [12] with abstract syntax in Table 1 , together with the following basic functions:
has values in the semantic domain D, where the undefined value is denoted by Υ and D Υ def = D ∪ {Υ }. We define an environment ρ ∈ E as a map from variables X ∈ dom(ρ) to values ρ(X) ∈ D Υ . Let χ be a subset of variables, then ρ| χ is the restriction of environment ρ to the domain dom(ρ) ∩ χ. The semantics is in Table 2 . A state σ i ∈ Σ def = E × C is a pair ρ, C , where C is the next command to be executed in the environment ρ. The transition relation between states specifies the set of states that can be reached from a given state:
The finite traces of a program P ∈ P are obtained by the computation of the lfp ⊆ F [[P ]], while the infinite traces by the computation of the gfp ⊆ F [[P ]], where
the set of finite and infinite traces of P .
Program Transformation. In [12] the authors define a language-independent methodology for systematically derive syntactic program transformations from semantic ones by mean of abstract interpretation (see Fig. 1 ). Given a program P ∈ P and a syntactic transformation τ : P → P which returns the transformed program τ [[P ]] ∈ P, we have that the corresponding semantic transformation t takes the semantics S[[P ]] ∈ ℘(Σ ∞ ) of P , and returns the semantics
] of the transformed program. We consider programs as an abstraction of their semantics, as formalized by the Galois connection ( ℘(Σ ∞ ); , p, P; ≤ , S), where p[S] is the simplest program whose semantics upper approximates S ∈ ℘(Σ ∞ ) [12] . Therefore the semantic transformation t : 
+ ). We denote by C the family of these code transformations.
Abstract interpretation-based code obfuscation
In this section we specify what is hidden by a syntactic transformation, by introducing a novel definition of code obfuscation based on semantics.
Definition 1. Let τ : P → P be a program transformation. τ is potent if there is a property α ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) such that:
Therefore a transformation τ is potent when there exists a property α and a program P such that the approximation of the concrete trace semantics of P is different from the same approximation for the concrete trace semantics of τ
Example 1. Let us consider a program P and its transformed version P : In order to factor the observational semantics into preserved and masked properties, we define the most concrete property preserved by a transformation τ : P → P, as follows δ τ
Given a program transformation τ we want to characterize the set of properties that are not preserved, i.e., obfuscated, by τ . By considering the transformation τ and the property α ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) that the attacker wants to observe, we note that α (δ τ α) is precisely what the transformation τ hides of the property α. In fact when α (δ τ α) = some parts of the property α has been lost in the transformation. In this case we say that the property α is obfuscated by the transformation τ , because that property cannot be observed on the semantics of the transformed program.
is the set of properties obfuscated by τ : P → P.
, we define a δ-obfuscator as any potent program transformation τ : P → P, such that every program is equivalent to its obfuscated version w.r.t. the particular observational semantics δ. In particular we can define a partial order between obfuscating transformations, by considering the set of properties that the transformations hide. Given two program transformations τ and τ , then τ is more potent than τ , denoted τ ≤ P τ , if O δτ ⊆ O δ τ . We can also compare the potency of τ and τ w.r.t. a particular property α, namely by measuring the approximation in the knowledge of that property that can be obtained by observing semantics.
In this case τ obfuscates the property α more than what τ does. From the structure of the lattice of abstract interpretations uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) we can derive the some basic properties of O δ and therefore of the potency of code obfuscations. Proposition 1. Let δ, µ ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) and τ, τ be program transformations:
, then for each property µ δ we have τ ≤ µ τ ; 5) If τ ≤ δ µ τ , then τ ≤ δ τ and τ ≤ µ τ .
Constructive characterization of potency
In this section we define a method for deriving δ τ for a given syntactic transformation τ : P → P. By Definition 2, this provides a characterization of the potency of a code transformation. Let t : ℘(Σ ∞ ) → ℘(Σ ∞ ) be a semantic transformation and K P,t : uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) → uco(℘(Σ ∞ )) be a domain transformer that, given a property µ ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )), returns the closest abstraction preserved by t on P ∈ P:
is a closure operator on sets of traces. In order to characterize the set of its fix-points, we have to specify the set of traces X ⊆ Σ ∞ preserved by the transformation t on a particular program P . The predicate Pres P,t (X), where X ∈ ℘(Σ ∞ ), precisely captures this notion, in fact Pres P,t (X) evaluates to true if and only if
K P,t (id) models the most concrete property preserved by the transformation t for the program P . The generalization of this notion for all programs follows straightforwardly.
An example: Obfuscation by program specialization
In this section we consider constant propagation as code obfuscation. This proves that our semantic-based approach to code obfuscation is adequate both to include a wide range of program transformation techniques and to compare them by extracting what is actually masked by the transformation. We follow Cousot & Cousot [12] in the definition of an algorithm for constant propagation.
Cousot's constant propagation
The residual R[[E]]ρ of an arithmetic or boolean expression E in an environment ρ is the expression resulting by the specialization of E in such environment (see Table 3 ). An expression E ∈ E ∪ B is static in the environment ρ, denoted
]ρ we denote the specialization of action A in the environment ρ (see Table 3 ). We consider syntactic and semantic program transformations relative to the constant propagation problem as formalized in [12] , where the arguments of the program transformation are the semantics S[[P ]] and the result of a constant detection static analysis
where α C is given by: This function, given a label L and a variable X, returns the least upper bounḋ on the flat lattice of program values for X at the program point L. Semantic transformation: The semantic transformation t C is defined in [12] where:
] is the transformation of traces, and
] is the transformation of states, where
]ρ| {X∈X|ρ C (X)∈DΥ } ∈ A r is action specialization. The syntactic transformation τ C can be systematically derived as shown in [12] . Observational semantics: Given a partial trace σ, the observational semantics α C O returns the sequence of its environments: 
Code obfuscation by constant propagation
In order to specify the properties obfuscated by constant propagation τ C , we derive δ τ C . Let us define the property θ as follows:
It is worth noting that θ is the most concrete property preserved by constant propagation τ C . Let us consider the property ϑ ∈ uco(℘(Σ ∞ )), observing the environment, the labels, and the type of actions:
, where type maps actions into the following set of action types {assign, skip, test}. This property belongs to O θ , meaning that O θ = ∅, as requested by Definition 3 and shown in Example 2 below. This proves that τ C is actually a program obfuscator, hiding the type of the command actions. This is a consequence of the structure of the masked closure ϑ (ϑ θ), which characterizes what is obfuscated from ϑ by τ C . Consider the closure η which observes the type of actions defined as follows:
The following theorem specifies that η is masked by the constant propagation, i.e., τ C obfuscates η.
Example 2. As observed above, ϑ is not preserved by t C , namely it could happen that: 
showing that the property η is not preserved.
Discussion
In this paper we introduce a notion of code obfuscation providing a general enough definition including both most program transformation techniques as obfuscators and the standard definition of Collberg et al. [5] as special cases. Moreover, it provides advanced techniques for comparing obfuscating algorithms relatively to their potency in the lattice of abstract interpretations. This definition can be considered as the first step towards a semantic-based theory for code obfuscation. Note however that in Definition 1 we consider abstractions of concrete semantics and not arbitrary sound, possibly incomplete, abstract interpretations. This makes Definition 1 too strong for modeling attackers which can be any decidable sound approximation of semantics, e.g., arbitrary static program analyzers. Consider the following example of program transformation: Therefore the previous transformation obfuscates program P for the sign analysis, because the static sign analysis of the transformed program is unable to get the sign of out. This is not captured by Definition 1, because Sign is incomplete for integer addition [16] . Indeed, in Definition 1, the abstraction is applied to the concrete semantics, returning Z + in both cases. It would be important to weaken our notion of potency by considering abstract semantics derived by sound (possibly incomplete) approximations of the concrete semantics. This is crucial in order to include in our model of attackers arbitrary sound program analyzers. Moreover the systematic design of program transformation by abstract interpretation [12] can be applied for the systematic design of code obfuscation algorithms, driven by the abstraction (semantic property) to be masked. We can observe that other program transformations, such as abstract watermarking [13] , can be seen as a particular code obfuscation. The relation between our notion of code obfuscation and abstract watermarking deserves further investigation.
